1 2 3 4 5 6 7	DAVID R. ZARO (BAR NO. 124334) JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO (BAR NO KENYON HARBISON (BAR NO. 2604) ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP 515 South Figueroa Street, Ninth Floor Los Angeles, California 90071-3309 Phone: (213) 622-5555 Fax: (213) 620-8816 E-Mail: dzaro@allenmatkins.com jdelcastillo@allenmatkins.com	. 239015) 16)	
8	Attorneys for Receiver STEPHEN J. DONELL		
9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
10	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
11			
12	SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,	Case No. 5:15-CV-02387-SVW (KKx)	
13	Plaintiff,	SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE	
14	V.	APPLICATION OF RECEIVER, STEPHEN J. DONELL, FOR ORDER	
15	ROBERT YANG, et al.,	TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CELTIC BANK SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CIVIL CONTEMPT	
16	Defendants,	CIVIL CONTEMPT	
17	YANROB'S MEDICAL, INC., et al.,	Date: June 6, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m. Ctrm: 6	
18 19	Relief Defendants.	Ctrm: 6 Judge: Hon. Stephen V. Wilson	
20	TO ALL PARTIES, THEIR COU	UNSEL OF RECORD, AND THIS	
21	HONORABLE COURT:		
22	Stephen J. Donell (the "Receiver"),	the Court-appointed receiver for	
23	Defendants Suncor Fontana, LLC, Suncor Hesperia, LLC, Suncor Care Lynwood,		
24	LLC, and their respective subsidiaries and	l affiliates (collectively, the "Receivership	
25	Entities"), hereby submits this Supplemental Brief in support of his pending ex parte		
26	Application for an Order to Show Cause Why Celtic Bank Should Not Be Held In		
27	Civil Contempt (the "Application") and in response to the Supplemental Brief filed		
28	by Celtic Bank ("Celtic") on May 3, 2016		

1 I. INTRODUCTION.

2 Despite Celtic's concerted efforts to complicate the issues before the Court, there is only one question to be addressed: has Celtic willfully failed to comply 3 with this Court's December 11, 2015 Preliminary Injunction, Order Appointing 4 Receiver, Freezing Assets, and Providing for Other Ancillary Relief (the 5 "Appointment Order") by refusing to turn over funds held in deposit accounts 6 7 owned by Receivership Entities at Celtic? There can be no reasonable dispute that 8 these funds are assets of the Receivership Entities, yet Celtic has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuses, to return these funds to the Receiver. 9 Accordingly, an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") why Celtic should not be held in 10 civil contempt is warranted. 11

The facts underlying the Receiver's Application are simple: the Appointment 12 Order directed all parties in possession of assets of the Receivership Entities 13 ("Receivership Assets" or "Assets") to turn such Assets over to the Receiver, and 14 barred all parties from taking any action to interfere with the Receiver's efforts to 15 obtain possession and control over such Assets. Celtic was provided with a copy of 16 17 the Appointment Order and a detailed tracing by the Receiver confirming that foreign Receivership Entity investors were the direct source of \$1 million of the 18 19 funds on deposit with Celtic. Celtic has refused to turn over the money.

20 The Receiver's Application appended excerpts from a deposition transcript 21 wherein defendant Yang further confirmed that the other \$1 million on deposit with Celtic originated with a domestic investor in HealthPro Capital Partners, LLC, a 22 Receivership Entity in direct privity with Celtic. Nonetheless – and despite 23 submitting a Certified Statement to the Receiver confirming that it is holding \$2 24 25 million in Receivership Assets subject to the turnover requirements of the Appointment Order – Celtic has refused to turn over the approximately \$2 million at 26 27 issue in the Application.

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1 The justifications Celtic offers for its noncompliance with the Appointment 2 Order are legion, ranging from the outlandish (the receivership and the Appointment 3 Order are unconstitutional), to the merely bizarre (the Court has no jurisdiction over Celtic or the \$2 million in issue), to the outright false (the Receiver has failed to 4 identify the source of the \$2 million on deposit). None of Celtic's excuses are 5 relevant or warranted, and each of its arguments studiously avoids the facts and the 6 7 applicable law. The Receiver therefore reiterates his request that the Court enter an 8 OSC re civil contempt for Celtic's willful and continued violation of the 9 Appointment Order's turnover requirement.

- 10 II. ARGUMENT.
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The Funds On Deposit With Celtic Are Receivership Assets. A.

12 Notwithstanding Celtic's baseless and unsupported contentions to the 13 contrary, it is not reasonably disputed that the \$2 million on deposit with Celtic is a 14 Receivership Asset. First, as already reflected in the Application, Celtic submitted a Certified Statement to the Receiver confirming the funds were Receivership Entity 15 funds. (See Dkt. Nos. 48 at 6:1-16 and Ex. A; 49, Ex. A; and 50, Ex. A.) Second, 16 17 the Receiver has confirmed (and submitted evidence to confirm) that the funds originated with Receivership Entity investors. (Id.) As such, these assets are 18 19 indisputably subject to the turnover requirement of the Appointment Order. 20But perhaps more simply, even when presenting its most incredible arguments, Celtic has never contended that the funds on deposit were anything other 21 than cash deposited by the Receivership Entities. It simply contends that it has a 22 security interest in the funds, which it claims justifies its willful violation of the 23 Appointment Order.¹ In point of fact, Celtic is no different from any other 24

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Celtic's invocation of the Small Business Association ("SBA") is irrelevant. The 26 SBA is merely a guarantor on two construction loans originated by Celtic and secured by real property belonging to the Receivership Entities. While the SBA's relation to the loans may be a concern to Celtic based on fears that the SBA will 27 not honor its guaranty as a consequence of Celtic's own conduct, nothing in the 28 Appointment Order or the governing law suggests that the Receivership Entities SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EX Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP PARTE APPLICATION

depository institution or person or entity holding Receivership Assets, and it must 1 2 comply with this Court's Appointment Order.

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B. **Courts In Similar Circumstances Have Required The Turnover Of Estate Assets.**

It is axiomatic that principles in bankruptcy can be applied by analogy to 5 federal receiverships. See, e.g., CFTC v. Topworth Int'l, Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107, 1116 6 7 (9th Cir. 1999); Fidelity Bank, Nat'l Assoc. v. M.M. Group, Inc., 77 F.3d 880, 882 8 (6th Cir. 1996); Unisys Fin. Corp. v. RTC, 979 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1992). Bankruptcy law is clear both with respect to the turnover of estate assets and the 9 impact of a security interest in claimed "collateral" in substantially similar contexts. 10 For instance, in U.S. v. Whiting Pools, Inc., the Supreme Court required a secured 11 12 creditor (in that instance, the IRS) to return a debtor's property in which the IRS had a secured interest, reasoning that a "reorganization effort would have small chance 13 of success" if essential assets "were excluded from the estate." 462 U.S. 198, 204 14 (1983). The Court went further, specifying that this principle "extends even to 15 property of the estate in which a creditor has a secured interest." Id. (emphasis 16 17 added). Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit has confirmed that "[c]ollateral which has been pledged by the debtor as security ... is property of the debtor's estate." In re-18 19 Air Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart, 845 F.2d 293, 296 (11th Cir. 1988) (emphasis 20 added).

21 The same principles apply here, and with equal force. As with a debtor in a reorganization proceeding, the Receiver cannot maximize the value of the estate and 22 benefit its creditors without access to all Receivership Assets. This means that, as in 23 the Whiting Pools matter, Celtic must be compelled to return the subject \$2 million 24 25 to the Receiver. Further, as confirmed by the Air Conditioning, Inc. court, the fact that Celtic may hold a security interest in the deposit accounts does not exempt 26

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should bear the cost of any origination, servicing, or other errors committed by 28 Celtic. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EX Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP

Celtic from its obligation to return the funds in those accounts to the Receiver. In
 other words, *none* of Celtic's defenses which invoke the SBA, or Celtic's claimed
 security interest in the depository accounts in which the \$2 million in Receivership
 Assets are held, are justifications for Celtic's noncompliance with the clear terms of
 the Appointment Order, and an OSC re civil contempt is warranted.

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C. Celtic's Remaining Arguments Are Equally Unfounded.

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1. <u>Neither the Application nor the Appointment Order violate</u> <u>Celtic's due process rights.</u>

9 In opposition to the Application, Celtic has repeatedly argued that either the Application or the Appointment Order itself violate its due process rights. As a 10 preliminary matter, Celtic has consistently failed to point the Court to any authority 11 12 supporting this contention. More importantly, the contention is in accurate: This is not a real property condemnation action and Celtic has consistently availed itself of 13 14 opportunities to be heard, both by opposing the Application and filing its (equally meritless) Motion for Leave to Intervene. Moreover, as a creditor of the 15 receivership estate, Celtic will have the right to participate in any eventual claims 16 17 and distribution process approved by this Court.

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2.

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<u>Celtic is indisputably in active concert or participation with the</u> <u>Receivership Entities.</u>

20 Celtic further argues that its due process rights would be violated were it 21 required to turn over the \$2 million in Receivership Assets because it is not in "active concert or participation" with any Receivership Entity. Without repeating 22 the previous controlling points, Celtic's statement is false. Indeed, most of Celtic's 23 defenses depend *entirely* upon agreements between two Receivership Entities and 24 25 Celtic. In other words, the contractual privity between the Receivership Entities and Celtic serves as the sole basis for Celtic's refusal to comply with the Appointment 26 27 Order. There can therefore be no question that Celtic remains in active concert or participation with the Receivership Entities, and is therefore bound by the 28

Appointment Order. See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945)
 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 injunction language binding entities in "active concert or
 participation" with parties is "is derived from the common-law doctrine that a decree
 of injunction not only binds the parties ... but also those ... in 'privity' with
 them[.]").

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3. <u>Celtic has not controverted any of the basic facts before the</u> <u>Court on the Receiver's Application, including that the funds in</u> <u>issue are Receivership Assets.</u>

9 Celtic relies upon Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) for the proposition that this Court may not impose a contempt sanction 10 absent an evidentiary hearing and discovery. Its reliance is misplaced. While, in 11 12 Peterson, the Ninth Circuit stated the general precept that "a district court ordinarily" should not impose contempt sanctions solely on the basis of affidavits[,] it went on 13 14 to confirm that contempt sanctions may be imposed on the pleadings if the key facts are not subject to dispute. Id. Such is the case here. Specifically, Celtic has never 15 provided any evidence to support its contention that the \$2 million in issue are not 16 17 Receivership Assets; instead, it has merely supplemented the information provided by the Receiver with its own contentions regarding its purported security interest. 18 19 However, as noted above, even assuming, *arguendo*, that Celtic has a security interest in the depository accounts in which the \$2 million is held, that security 20 21 interest *does not* excuse Celtic's noncompliance with the turnover requirement of the Appointment Order. Accordingly, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing here, 22 and an OSC re civil contempt is warranted. 23

Likewise, Celtic's bizarre contention that the Receiver has not established that the funds in issue are Receivership Assets is entirely unsupported by the record before the Court. As reflected in the Application, the Receiver has specifically and directly traced approximately \$1 million of the subject funds to foreign investors in what is commonly known as the Fontana Project and confirmed, via defendant

1 Yang's own testamentary admission, that the remaining \$1 million originated 2 exclusively with a domestic investor in HealthPro Capital Partners, LLC, another 3 Receivership Entity. (See Dkt. No. 48-50.)

Celtic's reliance on SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) for the 4 proposition that the Receiver must establish that Celtic has no interest in the funds at 5 issue before the Court can order a turnover is also misplaced. Colello does not 6 7 address a receiver's ability to enforce, via a request for a contempt sanction, a court's 8 turnover order. Instead, it merely stands for the proposition that, in order for the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") (not a receiver) to add a 9 party as a nominal defendant, that party must generally have "received ill gotten 10 funds *and* ... not have a legitimate claim to those funds." Id. (emphasis original). 11 The Commission is not the movant here, nor has Celtic been named as a nominal 12 defendant in this action. Most importantly, the funds in issue are Receivership 13 14 Assets. Accordingly, neither Colello or Celtic's repeatedly emphasized security interest is relevant. 15

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- 4. Celtic's claim that the Appointment Order is vague and unenforceable strains credulity.

In its supplemental briefing, Celtic claims that the Appointment Order is so 18 19 vague that it is impossible to determine whether accounts *held by and maintained* 20 for the benefit of, a Receivership Entity are accounts "relating to" the Receivership 21 Entities. (See Dkt. 59 at 4:15-17.) It would be an understatement to characterize this claim as outlandish. The Celtic accounts containing the \$2 million in issue here 22 are the literal definition of accounts "relating to" the Receivership Entities. 23 Moreover, Celtic ignores the fact that the Appointment Order specifically defines as 24 25 "Recoverable Assets" the assets of the named receivership defendants as well as "those assets of Relief Defendants ... HealthPro Capital Partners, LLC and Suncor 26 27 Care, Inc. that ... are *attributable to funds derived from investors*..." (emphasis added). Here, the funds on deposit are literally funds derived directly from

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investors. Accordingly, there can be no reasonable dispute that the \$2 million that 1 2 the Receiver has requested be returned falls squarely within the ambit of those 3 Assets the Court intended to be turned over. Celtic's effort to pretend otherwise is genuinely incredible and emphasizes the need for an OSC re civil contempt for its 4 5 misconduct. III. **CONCLUSION.** 6 7 For the foregoing reasons, as well as the reasons initially presented in his 8 Application and the documents in support thereof, the Receiver respectfully requests 9 that this Court enter an OSC re civil contempt in connection with Celtic's willful and persistent violation of the Appointment Order. 10 11 Dated: May 16, 2016 ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE 12 MALLORY & NATSIS LLP DAVID R. ZARO 13 JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO **KENYON HARBISON** 14 15 Joshua A. del Castillo By: /s/ JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO 16 Attorneys for Receiver 17 STEPHEN J. DONELL 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EX Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP PARTE APPLICATION

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1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2 3	Securities and Exchange Commission v. Robert Yang, Suncor Fontana, et al. USDC, Central District of California – Case No. 5:15-cv-02387-SVW (KKx)
3 4 5	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 515 S. Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071-3398.
6 7	A true and correct copy of the foregoing document(s) described below will be served in the manner indicated below:
8	SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION OF RECEIVER, STEPHEN J. DONELL, FOR
9 10	ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CELTIC BANK SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CIVIL CONTEMPT
11	1. <u>TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC</u>
12	FILING (''NEF'') – the above-described document will be served by the Court via NEF. On May 16, 2016 , I reviewed the CM/ECF Mailing Info For A Case
13	for this case and determined that the following person(s) are on the Electronic
14	Mail Notice List to receive NEF transmission at the email address(es) indicated below:
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4	2. <u>SERVED BY U.S. MAIL OR OVERNIGHT MAIL and EMAIL (indicate</u> method for each person or entity served): On, I served the following
5	person(s) and/or entity(ies) in this case by placing a true and correct copy
6	thereof in a sealed envelope(s) addressed as indicated below. I am readily familiar with this firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence
7 8	for mailing. Under that practice it is deposited with the U.S. postal service on that same day in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion
o 9	for party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than 1 (one) day after date of deposit for mailing in
10	affidavit.
11	
12	I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar of this Court
13	at whose direction the service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed
14	on <u>May 16, 2016</u> at Los Angeles, California.
15	s/ Martha Díaz
16	Martha Diaz
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