Case	2:24-cv-07660-SPG-JPR Document 93-2 ID #:4495	Filed 03/13/25 Page 1 of 17 Page		
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO (BAR NO MATTHEW D. PHAM (BAR NO. 28770 ALPHAMORLAI L. KEBEH (BAR NO. ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP 865 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2800 Los Angeles, California 90017-2543 Phone: (213) 622-5555 Fax: (213) 620-8816 E-Mail: jdelcastillo@allenmatkins.com mpham@allenmatkins.com	. 239015) 94) 336798)		
8	8 STEPHEN J. DONELL			
9	9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
10	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
11				
12	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,	Case No. 2:24-CV-07660-SPG-JPR		
13	Plaintiff,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF		
14	V.	AMENDED FIRST INTERIM APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT OF		
15	ASCEND CAPVENTURES INC., et al.,	FEES OF RECEIVER, STEPHEN J. DONELL, AND HIS		
16	Defendants.	PROFESSIONALS		
17		[Declaration of Stephen J. Donell; Declaration of Joshua A. del Castillo;		
18		Declaration of Brian J. Landau; Declaration of Alan R. Rosenberg; Declaration of Frances A. Smith; and [Proposed] Order submitted concurrently		
19 20		[Proposed] Order submitted concurrently [herewith]		
20		-		
22		Date: April 23, 2025 Time: 1:30 p.m. Ctrm: 5C		
23		Judge Hon. Sherilyn Peace Garnett		
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LAW OFFICES Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP				

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1 Stephen J. Donell (the "Receiver"), the Court-appointed receiver in the abovecaptioned action, along with his general receivership counsel, Allen Matkins Leck 2 Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP ("Allen Matkins"), his forensic accounting firm, SL 3 Biggs, and local counsel Ross, Smith & Binford, PC (now, Ross & Smith, PC, 4 "RSB") and Markowitz Ringel Trusty & Hartog, P.A. ("MRTH", and together with 5 Allen Matkins, SL Biggs, and RSB, the "Professionals"), hereby jointly submit this 6 memorandum of points and authorities in support of their concurrently and jointly 7 8 submitted Amended First Interim Application for the Payment of Fees (the 9 "Application").

In addition to this memorandum and the exhibits appended to the Application,
the Application is supported by the concurrently filed declarations of Stephen J.
Donell (the "Donell Decl."); Joshua A. del Castillo ("del Castillo Decl."); Brian J.
Landau ("Landau Decl."); Alan R. Rosenberg ("Rosenberg Decl."); and Frances A.
Smith ("Smith Decl.").

15 I. <u>PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.</u>

The Application is an amended version of the first interim fee application 16 17 submitted in the above-captioned action and covers the fees incurred by the Receiver and his Professionals (collectively, the "Applicants") during the period 18 from September 13, 2024 through October 31, 2024 (the "Application Period"). 19 20 By way of the Application, the Applicants request not only the Court's approval of their fees incurred during the Application Period but also the interim 21 payment of such fees, to be paid from the funds of the receivership estate 22 23 established in this action (the "Receivership Estate" or "Estate").

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unnecessary for the purposes of the Application. That said, the procedural history 24 and facts relevant to the Application are as follows: **Procedural History.** A. On September 9, 2024, plaintiff the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") 27

filed a complaint against numerous entity and individual defendants, commencing

-6-

A full recitation of the procedural history of the above-captioned action is

25 26

22 II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

authorize the payment of the fees sought under the Application.

the Application Period. 15 16 As discussed below, the Receiver believes in his reasonable business 17 judgment that the fees incurred by the Applicants during the Application Period in connection with the Receiver's pursuit of his duties under the Initial Appointment 18 19 Order (as the term is defined herein) are reasonable, appropriate, and have benefited 20 the Estate. Applicants accordingly respectfully request that the Court approve and

12 5 to the Application. These invoices contain the billing entries that describe the 13 14 specific tasks performed by the Receiver (and his staff) and his Professionals during

8 \$308,565.50 The Application sets forth the services rendered by the Applicants during the Application Period, which serve as the bases for the payments requested therein, are 11 more particularly detailed in the Applicants' invoices attached as **Exhibits 1** through

Application are as follows: Applicant

The amounts of the Applicants' fees sought to be approved and paid under the 1 2

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
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the above-captioned civil action. *See* ECF No. 1. The FTC's complaint alleged that
the defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to lure consumers into investing
large sums in purported e-commerce business opportunities, using false promises of
substantial passive income from online stores administered by the defendants. *See id.* On the basis of their allegations, the FTC petitioned this Court for injunctive
relief, and for the appointment of a receiver to assume authority and control over the
entity defendants. *See* ECF Nos. 4, 5.

8 On September 13, 2024, the Court entered the Order on Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application For (1) Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Why a 9 Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue; (2) Waiver of Notice Requirement; 10 (3) Appointment of a Temporary Receiver, Freezing of Assets; and other Equitable 11 Relief (the "Initial Appointment Order"). See ECF No. 30. Pursuant to the terms of 12 the Initial Appointment Order, and among other things, the Receiver was: 13 (1) vested with authority and control over the Receivership Entities (as that term is 14 defined in the Initial Appointment Order); (2) directed to marshal and collect 15 available assets of the Receivership Entities; (3) charged with undertaking an 16 analysis of the business and financial activities of the entities and producing an 17 accounting; and (4) authorized to designate non-parties as additional Receivership 18 Entities, subject to a notice process. (Id.) The Receiver's authority under the Initial 19 Appointment Order was extended by subsequent orders of this Court;¹ critically 20 including .the Court's December 3, 2024 Order Granting Stipulation for Court to 21 22 Enter Preliminary Injunction (the "Preliminary Injunction") [ECF No. 82], which reaffirmed the Receiver's duties and authority. 23 24 On February 24, 2025, the Court entered its Order Denying, in Part, and

- 25 Granting, in Part, First Interim Application for Payment of Fees and
- 26 *Reimbursement of Expenses of Receiver Stephen J. Donell and his Professionals*
- 27

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(the "<u>Initial Fee Order</u>") [ECF No. 89], pursuant to which the Court denied the
 initial version of this Application, in part, without prejudice to its resubmission in
 clarified and supplemented form. The Applicants take the Court's Initial Fee Order
 seriously, and hope and believe that the Application in its present form successfully
 addresses the issues previously raised by the Court.

- On February 24, 2025, the Court also entered its Order Granting Stipulation: 6 7 (1) Authorizing Turnover of Sales Proceeds by Granite Escrow and Settlement 8 Services; (2) Authorizing Receiver to Manage, Market, and Sell Residential Real Properties; and (3) Releasing Defendants' Claims to Proceeds Held or Recovered 9 by Receiver (the "Turnover Order") [ECF No. 92], pursuant to which the Court 10 authorized and directed certain assets determined by the Receiver to be assets of the 11 Estate to be turned over to the Receiver, free and clear of any claims by defendants 12 Basta or Leung. In accordance with the terms of the Turnover Order, approximately 13 \$400,000 in additional funds have been turned over to the Receiver, and the 14 Receiver is in the process of assuming authority over the real properties at issue in 15 the Turnover Order, which properties he presently believes have a net value to the 16 Estate of approximately \$1 million. (See Donell Decl. ¶ 9.) In total, the Receiver 17 has recovered more than \$800,000 in cash for the benefit of the Estate and its 18 19 creditors, not including the value of the two properties, for a total of approximately 20 \$1.8 million in value. (*Id.*)
- 21

B. Factual Background.

As reflected in the Application, the Receiver has, with the assistance of his
Professionals, diligently performed his duties as established in the Initial
Appointment Order and Preliminary Injunction, including to protect and preserve
the value of the Receivership Entities and their assets. Having supported and
facilitated the Receiver's efforts, the Applicants now request that the Court approve
their respective fees incurred during the Application Period and authorize the

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payment of such fees from the funds of the Receivership Estate, which now has
 funding sufficient to more than pay for the requested fees.

During the Application Period, and with substantial assistance from his 3 Professionals, the Receiver undertook efforts in four critical areas of relevance to his 4 duties under the Initial Appointment Order: (a) undertaking efforts to preserve the 5 status quo and prevent ongoing harm to allegedly injured Entity customers; 6 7 (b) developing an understanding of the business and financial activities of the 8 Receivership Entities (as defined in the Initial Appointment Order) in order to determine whether they are operating a legitimate business enterprise that has value 9 as a going concern, including inspections and investigations of the Receivership 10 Entities' purported places of business; (c) preparing a preliminary accounting of the 11 funds raised and expended by the Receivership Entities and their principals and 12 agents, including identifying and assuming control over funds recoverable for the 13 benefit of the Estate and its creditors (including consumers allegedly defrauded by 14 the Receivership Entities); and (d) tracing and recovering funds apparently 15 unlawfully diverted from the Receivership Entities for the unilateral benefit of the 16 defendants, including but not limited to the purchase of real property assets in 17 multiple states, some of which have since been turned over to the Receiver. 18

19 As reflected in the Receiver's *First Interim Report and Petition for* 20 Instructions (ECF No. 77-1) and Second Interim Report and Petition for Instructions (ECF No. 88-1), the Receiver has been unable to confirm, in his reasonable business 21 22 judgment, that the Receivership Entities' e-commerce servicing business was entirely or consistently legitimate, notwithstanding the fact that the Entities appear 23 to have occasionally provided at least limited e-commerce services to certain 24 25 consumers. In addition, the Receiver has preliminarily concluded that the 26 Receivership Entities likely cannot be operated (or sold) as a going concern. 27 Among the reasons underlying these preliminary conclusions are: (a) the Receivership Entities' purported places of business did not contain any items or 28

records suggesting the existence of a properly administered commercial enterprise; 1 (b) the Receivership Entities maintained few, if any, records in a manner consistent 2 with the customs and practices of a commercial enterprise; (c) the Receivership 3 Entities diverted millions of dollars in funds raised from consumers for purposes 4 apparently unrelated to their e-commerce business, critically including to enable the 5 Receivership Entities' principals, or their affiliates, to purchase multi-million dollar 6 7 properties; and (d) notwithstanding the commencement of the instant receivership, 8 persons apparently employed by the Entities in the pre-receivership period have 9 consistently pursued efforts to solicit additional payments – allegedly on behalf of the Entities – for services that the Receiver is confident would never be provided; in 10 other words, former Entity personnel appear to have engaged in a post-receivership 11 effort to defraud Entity consumers. 12

The Receiver is confident that the work he and his Professionals have 13 performed to date has been valuable to the Estate. Indeed, their collective efforts 14 have resulted in the identification and recovery of an estimated \$1.8 million in 15 monetary value for the benefit of the Estate and its creditors – recoveries that would 16 have been impossible or substantially more difficult or protracted had the Receiver 17 18 and his Professionals not undertaken the efforts described in the Application. These 19 efforts also paid non-monetary dividends, critically including a reduction in ongoing consumer harm resulting from the Receiver's and his Professionals' diligent efforts 20 to close down unlawful post-receivership efforts to solicit Entity customers, suspend 21 22 ongoing billing operations to customers for services that were not provided, and efforts to facilitate consumer contact with various online marketing platforms (e.g., 23 Amazon, Wal-Mart, etc.), all of which involved affirmative work by the Receiver, 24 25 his counsel, and his forensic accountant. Given the amount and significance of the 26 work completed by the Applicants during the Application Period, the Receiver 27 respectfully submits that the fees incurred by the Applicants are reasonable and

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appropriate, and should be approved and paid, in full, in the amounts indicated in
 the Application.

- 3 III. <u>ARGUMENT.</u>
- 4

A. Receivership Fees and Expenses.

5 It is a fundamental principle of receivership law that the administrative and
6 professional fees and expenses of a receiver and his supporting professionals
7 constitute priority expenses for which compensation should be paid from the assets
8 of the receivership. As reflected in the leading treatise, *Clark on Receivers*:

9 The obligations and expense which the court creates in its 10 administration of the [receivership estate] are necessarily 11 burdens on the [estate] ... The appointing court pledges its 12 good faith that all duly authorized obligations incurred 13 during the receivership shall be paid.

14 2 Clark, Ralph Ewing, *A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers* § 637,
15 p. 1052 (3d ed. Rev. 1992).

16 Put another way, "[a]s a general rule, the expenses and fees of a receivership 17 are a charge upon the property administered [,]" and, where "a receiver reasonably and diligently discharges his duties, he is entitled to compensation." Gaskill v. 18 19 Gordon, 27 F.3d 248, 25, 2531 (7th Cir. 1994); see also SEC v. Byers, 590 F.Supp.2d 637, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("A receiver appointed by a court who 20 21 reasonably and diligently discharges his duties is entitled to be fairly compensated 22 for services rendered[.]"). The fees and expenses of a receivership include the fees 23 and expenses incurred by the receiver, in addition to those fees and expenses incurred by the receiver's professionals in rendering services to the receiver. See 24 25 Drilling & Expl. Corp. v. Webster, 69 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1934). Decisions 26 regarding the amount and timing of an award of receivership fees and expenses are 27 committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See SEC v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 28 1560, 1577 (11th Cir. 1992). While a district court has "broad powers and wide

discretion in crafting relief," including in "distributing receivership assets" (Quilling 1 2 v. Trade Partners, Inc., 572 F.3d 293, 301 (6th Cir. 2009)), because of the nature of the services provided by a receiver and his professionals, the benefit a receiver 3 confers upon a given estate cannot be determined solely on the basis of the increase 4 or decrease in value of property in the receiver's possession. *Elliott*, 953 F.2d at 5 1577 ("[I]t is sometimes difficult to ascertain what type of benefits a receiver has 6 7 bestowed ... Even though a receiver may not have increased, or prevented a 8 decrease in, the value of the collateral, if a receiver reasonably and diligently discharges his duties, he is entitled to compensation.") (citations omitted). 9

Fortunately here, as reflected in his various submissions to the Court, the 10 Receiver has steadily increased the value of the Estate, from literally nothing on-11 hand on the first day of the receivership to an estimated monetary value of 12 approximately \$1.8 million, to say nothing of the non-monetary value arising from 13 14 the Receiver's successful and ongoing efforts to prevent further harm to stakeholders. Accordingly, the Applicants respectfully submit that their request for 15 approval and payment of their respective fees is appropriate, and for the reasons 16 17 discussed below, request that the Court exercise its discretion and approve and authorize the interim payment of the requested fees from the funds of the 18 Receivership Estate. 19

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B. The Requested Fees Are Reasonable.

21 The fees of a receiver and his professionals must be reasonable. See San 22 Vicente Med. Partners, Ltd. v. Orr (In re San Vicente Med. Partners, Ltd.), 962 F.2d 1402, 1409 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining the reasonableness of the fees requested 23 in connection with a receivership, a court should consider the time records 24 25 presented, the quality of the work performed, the complexity of the problems faced, 26 and the benefit of the services rendered to the receivership estate. See SEC v. Fifth 27 Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In a practical sense, once it has determined that an applicant's services were reasonable, the court 28

simply multiplies the number of hours expended by the applicant's hourly rate. Cf. 1 2 Sw. Media, Inc. v. Rau, 708 F.2d 419, 427 (9th Cir. 1983) (Bankruptcy Act case), superseded in part by statute, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 3 92 Stat. 2549, as recognized in U.S. Tr. v. Tamm (In re Hokulani Square, Inc.), 460 4 B.R. 763 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011). Indeed, even when evaluating requested fees as 5 compared to recoveries, courts in common fund cases analogous to receiverships 6 have approved amounts reflecting between 20% and 33% of total recoveries as 7 8 consistent with standards of presumptive reasonableness. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d 9 602, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Pacific Enters. Secs. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th 10

11 Cir. 1995).

12 Here, the Application describes the nature of the services that have been rendered by the Applicants and, where appropriate, the identity and billing rate of 13 the individual performing each specific task. The Applicants have endeavored to 14 staff matters as efficiently as possible in light of the level of experience required and 15 the complexity of the issues presented. In general, the Application reflects either the 16 Applicants' customary billing rates and the rates charged for comparable services in 17 other matters, or rates including discounts and other reductions specific to the 18 19 instant receivership as an accommodation to the Estate, as identified in the 20 Application. By way of example, the Receiver and Allen Matkins have applied across-the-board discounts of 10% to the hourly rates of all timekeepers in this 21 22 matter, in addition to applying additional discounts as deemed appropriate (indeed, Allen Matkins has discounted its rates by nearly 36% for certain timekeepers, as 23 compared to its national rates, and applied additional write-offs to the fees requested 24 25 in the Application, as an accommodation to the Estate). See, e.g., Donell Decl. at ¶ 4, del Castillo Decl. ¶ 3. As a result of these and other accommodations, the 26 27 Applicants' requested fees total just 17% of the estimated monetary value recovered by the Receiver to date. 28

The Receiver has reviewed the Application and, in his reasonable business
 judgment, believes the fees requested by the Applicants to be fair and reasonable
 and an accurate representation of the work performed. *See* Donell Decl. ¶ 9. The
 Receiver likewise believes that the Receivership Estate has benefited from the
 services identified in the Application. *Id.*

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C. The Applicants Are Highly Experienced Practitioners And Their Hourly Rates Are Appropriate.

8 In its Initial Fee Order, the Court noted that the original version of the Application did not include any attestation regarding the Applicants' respective 9 expertise in the context of federal receivership matters, nor the propriety of their 10 respective hourly rates for a federal receivership. As reflected in the Application, 11 each of the Applicants is highly qualified, with years of experience in fiduciary 12 matters, including receiverships. (See Donell Decl. ¶ 5; del Castillo Decl. ¶ 2, 4; 13 Landau Decl. ¶ 2, 3; Rosenberg Decl. ¶ 2, 3; Smith Decl. ¶ 2, 3.) In addition, 14 each Applicant is familiar with the prevailing rates for similarly qualified 15 practitioners in their areas, and has determined that their rates are consistent with, or 16 below, rates charged by similarly qualified professionals on similar matters. (See 17 Donell Decl. ¶ 4; del Castillo Decl. ¶ 5; Landau Decl. ¶ 5; Rosenberg Decl. ¶ 4; 18 19 Smith Decl. ¶ 4.) By way of example, in addition to the significant discounts it has applied to its fees in this matter, Allen Matkins' rates are, in some cases, nearly half 20 of those charged by competing firms in other federal receivership matters. (See, 21 22 *e.g.*, del Castillo Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. B) (among other things, reflecting competing firm charging as much as \$930 per hour for associates and \$1,510 per hour for partners in 23 24 receivership representation).

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D. The Application Has Been Submitted To The FTC For Review And Comment, Without Opposition.

With respect to compensation requests made by a receiver in a federal
enforcement action, courts give great weight to the judgment and experience of the

government agency prosecuting the underlying action. As one court has noted in a 1 2 bankruptcy case in which the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") participated, "it is proper to [keep] in mind that the [SEC] is about the only wholly 3 disinterested party in [this] proceeding and that . . . its experience has made it 4 thoroughly familiar with the general attitude of the Courts and the amounts of 5 allowances made in scores of comparable proceedings." In re Phila. & Reading 6 7 Coal & Iron Co., 61 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (Bankruptcy Act case). 8 Indeed, the government agency's positions are not "mere casual conjectures, but are recommendations based on closer study than a district judge could ordinarily give to 9 such matters." Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431, 438 (2d Cir. 1950) (citation 10 omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Bankruptcy Act case). And such 11 "recommendations as to fees of the [government agency] may be the only solution 12 to the very undesirable subjectivity with variations according to the particular judge 13 under particular circumstances which has made the fixing of fees seem often to be 14 upon nothing more than an ipse dixit basis." Id. (citation omitted) (internal 15 quotation marks omitted). Thus, the government agency's position on a fee request 16 should be "given great weight." Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, 364 F. Supp. at 1222. 17

18 Here, in order to ensure that the fees and expenses requested in the 19 Application are reasonable and appropriate, the Applicants submitted a draft of the 20 Application, along with their invoices, to the FTC for review prior to filing. The 21 FTC has confirmed that it does not oppose the Application and the Applicants understand and believe that the FTC intends to submit a formal notice of non-22 opposition in connection with the filing of the amended Application. The FTC is 23 24 likely in the best position to measure the fees and expenses requested in the instant 25 receivership against those incurred in other, similar proceedings and cases of similar complexity, see Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 61 F. Supp. at 124, and any 26 27 decision on its part not to object to the Application merits significant deference.

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Accordingly, the Applicants respectfully request that the Court approve the fees
 sought in the Application.

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E. The Receiver Should Be Authorized To Pay All Approved Fees From Cash On-Hand.

5 Where, as here, the fees requested are reasonable and "both the magnitude and the protracted nature of a case impose economic hardships on professionals 6 rendering services to the estate," an interim award of fees is appropriate. CFPB v. 7 8 Pension Funding, LLC, Case No. SACV 15-1329-JLS (JCGx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187607, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016). Indeed, interim payments are 9 necessary "to relieve counsel and others from the burden of financing lengthy and 10 complex . . . proceedings." In re Rose Way, Inc., Case No. 89-1273-C H, 1990 11 Bankr. LEXIS 3028, at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Mar. 1, 1990) (citing In re Mansfield 12 Tire & Rubber Co., 19 B.R. 125 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (bankruptcy case)). Thus, 13 an interim payment of the Applicants' requested fees is appropriate. 14

Notably, and as compared to the circumstances at issue when the original
version of the Application was filed, the Receiver has recovered funds far in excess
of the amount necessary to pay the fees requested in the Application, and has
increased the estimated value of the Estate, for the benefit of its creditors, by over
\$1.5 million since the original version of the Application was filed. Accordingly,
the Receiver respectfully submits that the fees requested in the Application can, and
should, be paid from cash on-hand.

22 IV. <u>CONCLUSION.</u>

- For the foregoing reasons, the Applicants respectfully request that this Courtenter an order:
- 25

1. Granting this Application in its entirety;

- 26 2. Approving the Receiver's fees incurred during the Application Period,
 27 the respective amount of \$69,897.15;
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1	3. Approving Allen Matkins' fees incurred during the Application Period,		
2	in the amount of \$145,013.85;		
3	4. Approving MRTH's fees incurred during the Application Period, in the		
4	amount of \$3,000.00;		
5	5. Approving RSB's fees incurred during the Application Period, in the		
6	amounts of \$20,317.50;		
7	6. Approving SL Biggs' fees incurred during the Application Period, in		
8	the amount of \$70,337.00; and		
9	Authorizing the Receiver to pay himself and his Professionals the above-		
10	approved fees, in full, from the fund	s of the Estate.	
11			
12	Dated: March 13, 2025	ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP	
13		JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO MATTHEW D. PHAM	
14		ALPHAMORLAI L. KEBEH	
15		By: /s/ Joshua A. del Castillo	
16		JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO Attorneys for Receiver	
17		Attorneys for Receiver STEPHEN J. DONELL	
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